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INTRODUCTION 
Appellant takes this opportunity to respond to the arguments 
set forth in the respective briefs of the two Respondents. The 
remaining arguments of the Appellant are adequately covered in 
Appellant's original Appellate Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. Casa Herrerra„ Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The intent of the Utah Legislature in adopting the amended 
version of U.C.A. §78-15-3 was to provide a claimant with a 
reasonable opportunity to discover the facts necessary for the 
accrual of a products liability cause of action, prior to the 
running of the statute of limitations period. 
Accepted rules of statutory construction require that a 
statute be construed in conformance with relevantf existing tort 
law, and that a statute be given a reasonable and sensible 
construction, which will best promote the protection of the public. 
Aragon's interpretation of U.C.A. §78-15-3 is consistent with the 
intent of the legislature, as well as with common principles of 
statutory construction. 
U.C.A. §78-15-3 is the statute of limitations provision that 
should govern the above entitled lawsuit. The legislature has 
incorporated the "discovery rule" into U.C.A. §78-15-3, mandating 
a common law requirement that the statute of limitations period be 
tolled until the Plaintiff discovers the identity of the manufac-
turer of the product causing the injury. There is a genuine issue 
1 
of material fact as to whether Plaintiff/Appellant James M. Aragon 
should have discovered the identity of Casa Herrerra, Inc. more 
than two years prior to October 16, 1990. 
Finally, because the trial court set aside James M. Aragon's 
default judgment against Casa Herrerra, Inc., presumably, so that 
the lawsuit could proceed on its merits, it is now inequitable to 
allow Casa Herrerra, Inc. to obtain the equivalent of a default 
judgment against Aragon—by granting its motion for summary 
judgment based on non-compliance with the the applicable statute of 
limitations provision—unless it is absolutely, unquestionably 
mandated. 
B. Clover Club Foods Companv/Borden, Inc/s Motion for Summary 
Judgment• 
The issue of whether Borden, Inc. paid any of James M. 
Aragon's worker's compensation award was not litigated in the 
worker's compensation proceedings before the Utah Industrial 
Commission. Therefore, the litigation of such issue in this 
lawsuit is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
A genuine issue of material fact exists concerning the issue 
of whether Borden, Inc. is the common law employer of Aragon, and 
concerning the issue of whether Borden, Inc. paid any of James M. 
Aragon's workers's compensation award. Accordingly, there exists 
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Borden, Inc. is 
entitled to the protection of the exclusive remedy provisions of 
U.C.A. §35-1-60. 
Finally, because the trial court, in arriving at its ruling on 
summary judgment, ultimately relied upon the exact same factual 
2 
allegations proffered by Defendant that Plaintiff wished to rebut, 
in requesting his Rule 56(f) motion for continuance to conduct 
further discovery, it was reversible error on the part of the trial 
court to deny Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ARAGON'S INTERPRETATION OF U.C.A. §78-15-3 IS 
CONSISTENT WITH THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT AND WITH 
ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. 
A. The complete history of U.C.A. S78-15-3 reflects the 
Legislature's intent to toll the running of the statute of 
limitations period until the injured party has discovered that a 
cause of action has accrued.. 
In the case of Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670, 684 
(Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court held that the old version of 
U.C.A. §78-15-3, which set forth a statute of repose in product 
liability cases, was unconstitutional. This ruling was based on 
the fact that situations existed in which the statute of repose 
barred the filing of a lawsuit, even though the cause of action did 
not arise until after it was barredf and even when the injured 
person had been diligent in seeking a judicial remedy. Id.. In 
April of 1989, the Utah State Legislature repealed U.C.A. §78-15-2 
of the Product Liability Act, which code section originally stated 
the purpose of the Act, and also amended U.C.A. §78-15-3, the 
statute of limitations provision of the Act. The amended version 
of U.C.A. §78-15-3 states the following: 
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"A civil action under this chapter shall be brought 
within two years from the time the individual who would 
be the claimant in such action discovered, or in the 
exercise of due diligence should have discovered, both 
the harm and its cause." 
In the case of State v. Amador, 804 P. 2d 1233, 1234 (Utah App. 
1990), the Utah Appellate Court stated the following concerning the 
amendment of statutory law: 
"Every amendment not expressly characterized as a 
clarification carries the rebuttable presumption that it 
is intended to change existing legal rights and 
liabilities." 
Accordingly, because the Legislature repealed U.C.A. §78-15-2, 
there is a legal presumption that the Legislature, in drafting the 
Utah Product Liability Act, changed its intent from that stated in 
the original legislation. 
Furthermore, because the new statute of limitations provision, 
stated in U.C.A. §78-15-3, incorporates the "discovery rule," the 
revised statute itself shows a change in the Legislature's intent 
concerning the Utah Product Liability Act. It appears that the 
Legislature, in drafting the revised statute of limitations 
provision of U.C.A. §78-15-3, intended to toll the running of the 
statute of limitations period, until an injured party has had a 
reasonable opportunity to discover that a cause of action based on 
products liability has accrued. 
If, in drafting the current Product liability Act statute of 
limitations provision, the Legislature intended to toll the running 
of the statute of limitations period until the claimant discovered 
or should have discovered that his cause of action had accrued, it 
is logical to make the discovery of the identity of the 
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manufacturer of the alleged harmful product a necessary element in 
the accrual of a products liability action. As a practical matter, 
a claimant in a products liability action cannot effectively pursue 
such an action until he has discovered the identity of the manufac-
turer of the harmful product, which product is an inanimate object. 
It goes without saying that it would be absurd to require a 
Plaintiff to attempt to extract damages from the offending res—the 
product causing the injury. Therefore, Plaintiff's interpretation 
of U.C.A. §78-15-3 is consistent with the Utah State Legislature's 
intent to toll the running of the statute of limitations period 
until the injured party discovers that a cause of action has 
accrued. 
B. Aragon's interpretation of U.C.A. S78-15-3 is consistent 
with accepted principles of statutory construction. 
Aragon is requesting the Court of Appeals to interpret U.C.A. 
§78-15-3 to require that the two-year statute of limitations period 
for a products liability action be tolled until the claimant has 
discovered, or in the exercise of due diligence should have 
discovered, both the harm, and its cause. Additionally, Aragon is 
requesting the Court of Appeals to interpret the word "cause" to 
include an awareness of the product that caused the claimant's 
injury, as well as an awareness of the identity of the maker of 
that product. This interpretation is consistent with accepted 
principles of statutory construction. 
U.C.A. §68-3-2 states in relevant part: 
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"The statutes establish the laws of this state respecting 
the subjects to which they relate, and their provisions 
and all proceedings under them are to be liberally 
construed with a view to effect the objects of the 
statutes and to promote justice." 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that U.C.A. §68-3-2 directs Utah 
appellate courts to construe statutes liberally, with a view to 
effect their objects and to promote justice, especially when an 
interpretation of a particular statute is a question of first 
impression before the appellate courts. Brickyard Homeowners' 
Ass'n v. Gibbons Realty, 668 P.2d 535, 538 (Utah 1983). Because 
the interpretation of the relevant statute in this case, U.C.A. 
§78-15-3, is an issue of first impression before the Utah appellate 
courts, the Court of Appeals is required to construe the statute 
liberally, with a view to effect its object and promote justice. 
As has been explained above, the object and intent of the subject 
statute is to toll the running of the statute of limitations period 
on products liability actions, until the claimant has discovered or 
should have discovered the facts necessary for the accrual of his 
cause of action. 
Defendant has argued that the only facts necessary for the 
accrual of a products liability action in Utah are (1) that the 
Plaintiff has discovered that he has been harmed, and (2) that the 
Plaintiff has discovered the product that has caused his harm. 
However, Defendant ignores the fact that, until the Plaintiff has 
had a reasonable opportunity to discover the identity of the 
manufacturer of the product that has caused his harm, he cannot, as 
a practical matter, bring a cause of action to remedy his 
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situation, because he has no one to sue. Accordingly, an 
interpretation of U.C.A. §78-15-3 that requires a Plaintiff to 
bring a cause of action before he has had a reasonable opportunity 
to discover the identity of the proper Defendant (namely, the 
manufacturer of the product that has caused him harm) is unjust. 
Moreover, such an interpretation does not accomplish the 
object of the statute of limitations provision found in U.C.A. §78-
15-3. The whole purpose of legislating the amended version of 
U.C.A. §78-15-3 was to provide a person injured by a product with 
reasonable opportunity to discover that his cause of action against 
a products manufacturer had accrued, before the statute of 
limitations provision expired. If the identity of the manufac-
turer of the harmful product is not required to be an essential 
element in the accrual of a cause of action for products liability, 
the actual effect of the new products liability statute of limit-
ations provision is the same as the effect of the old products 
liability statute of repose—it has the potential to bar a 
claimant's cause of action for products liability before the 
claimant is even aware of all facts necessary to properly pursue 
such a cause of action. 
U.C.A. §68-3-11 states the following: 
"Words and phrases are to be construed according to the 
context and the approved usage of the language; but 
technical words and phrases, and such others as have 
acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or 
are defined by statute, are to be construed according to 
such peculiar and appropriate definition. 
As was stated in Appellant's original Appellate Brief, in the 
context of a products liability statute of limitations provision, 
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the word "cause" has been given a definition by the majority of 
state jurisdictions to mean "both the product that caused the harm 
to the Plaintiff and the identity of the manufacturer of such 
product." The Utah Supreme Court has held that the Legislature is 
presumed to be aware of special legal definitions or meanings given 
to words used in legislation, and is presumed to have attached 
those meanings or definitions to such words, in a statute that 
becomes law. See, Greenhalgh v. Pavson City, 530 P.2d 799, 801 
(Utah 1975). Thus, it should be presumed that, at the time the 
Legislature created the amended version of U.C.A. §78-15-3, it was 
aware of how the courts of other jurisdictions interpreted the word 
"cause" in the context of statute of limitations provisions 
concerning products liability actions. It should also be presumed 
that the Legislature intended the word "cause" to be given the 
legal meaning applied to such word by the majority of other state 
jurisdictions in that context. Therefore, it should be presumed 
that the Legislature intended U.C.A. §78-15-3 to be given the 
interpretation requested by the Plaintiff in the above entitled 
matter. 
Also, the Utah Supreme Court recently stated the following: 
"It is also proper in construing a statute which deals 
with tort claims to interpret the statute in accord with 
relevant tort law. Finally, in dealing with an unclear 
statute, this court renders interpretations that will 
best promote the protection of the public." 
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991). 
Appellant has encouraged the court to interpret U.C.A. §78-15-3 in 
accordance with the majority rule of common law set forth in the 
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tort case law of other jurisdictions. It is a correct principle of 
statutory construction to do so. By adopting the interpretation of 
U.C.A. §78-15-3 requested by Appellant, the Court of Appeals will 
best promote the protection of the public. Such an interpretation 
will not create the risk that some claimants will have their 
products liability claims barred before they have had a reasonable 
opportunity to discover all elements necessary to bring a valid 
products liability action in a court of law. 
Plaintiff's interpretation of U.C.A. §78-15-3 is also 
consistent with the principle of statutory construction stated in 
the case of Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 
(Utah 1978), in which the Utah Supreme Court stated the following: 
"A sound rule of statutory interpretation is that a 
statute is presumed not to be intended to produce absurd 
consequences and that where possible it will be given a 
reasonable and sensible construction. This Court 
recognizes its duty to render such interpretation of the 
laws as will best promote the protection of the public." 
Certainly, an interpretation of U.C.A. §78-15-3 that would bar a 
plaintiff's cause of action before he had a reasonable opportunity 
to discover the identity of the proper defendant would produce 
absurd consequences. 
Finally, the Respondent argues that the its restrictive 
interpretation of U.C.A. §78-15-3 achieves an appropriate balance 
between competing objectives. Respondent, however, ignores the 
fact that the severe hardship placed on a Plaintiff by having his 
claim absolutely barred by a restrictive statutory interpretation 
far exceeds any potential hardship that might be placed on a 
Defendant who may have some difficulty of proof caused by the 
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passage of time. In this case, the Defendant, Casa Herrerra, Inc., 
has produced no evidence to show that passage of time has 
perceivably prejudiced or imposed any hardship on said Defendant. 
POINT II 
BY EXPRESSLY INCORPORATING THE "DISCOVERY RULE" INTO 
U.C.A. §78-15-3# THE LEGISLATURE HAS MANDATED A COMMON 
LAW REQUIREMENT THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PERIOD BE 
TOLLED UNTIL A PLAINTIFF DISCOVERS THE IDENTITY OF THE 
HARMFUL PRODUCT'S MANUFACTURER. 
U.C.A. §78-15-3 expressly incorporates the "discovery rule" 
into the Utah Product Liability Act statute of limitations 
provision. U.C.A. §78-15-3 states the following: 
"A civil action under this chapter shall be brought 
within two years from the time the individual who would 
be the claimant in such action discovered, or in the 
exercise of due diligence should have discovered, both 
the harm and its cause." (Emphasis added.) 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that, when the "discovery rule" 
is specifically incorporated into a statute of limitations 
provision, the statute of limitations period does not begin to run 
until the facts forming the basis for the cause of action are 
discovered [or should have been discovered]. Becton Dickinson and 
Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983). 
As was explained previously in this Reply Brief, in creating 
U.C.A. §78-15-3 the Legislature intended to guard the public 
against a perceived risk, namely, that a claimant might have his 
products liability claim barred before he has had a reasonable 
opportunity to discover all the facts forming the basis for a cause 
of action. One necessary element or fact forming the basis for the 
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accrual of a products liability action is the identity of the 
manufacturer of the product that harmed the Plaintiff• 
Accordingly, by incorporating the "discovery rule" into U.C.A. §78-
15-3, the Legislature demonstrated its intent to allow a claimant 
a reasonable opportunity to discover all facts necessary to form 
the basis for a valid products liability cause of action, 
including the identity of the manufacturer of the product that 
caused the claimant's injury. 
POINT III 
BECAUSE U.C.A. §78-15-3 IS A MORE SPECIFIC AND MORE 
RECENTLY LEGISLATED STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROVISION, IT 
SHOULD GOVERN THIS LAWSUIT, RATHER THAN THE GENERAL FOUR-
YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROVISION FOUND IN U.C.A. 
S78-12-25(3). 
In the case of Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 
214, 216 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court stated the following: 
"When two statutory provisions appear to conflict, the 
more specific provision will govern over the more general 
provision. Thus . . . a limitation period for a specific 
type of action . . . controls over an older, more general 
statute of limitations." (Citations omitted.) 
Obviously, U.C.A. §78-15-3 is both a more specific and a more 
recent statute of limitations provision than the general four-year 
statute of limitations provision found in U.C.A. §78-12-25(3). As 
was explained in Appellant's original Appellate Brief, because the 
general four-year statute of limitations provision of U.C.A. §78-
12-25(3) had not yet expired on the effective date of the new 
products liability statute of limitations provision, U.C.A. §78-
15-3 became the governing statute of limitations provision for the 
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above entitled case on its effective date (April 24, 1989). U.C.A. 
§12-25(3) would continue to be the applicable statute of limita-
tions provision in the above entitled lawsuit, only if Aragon had 
discovered or should have discovered all facts forming the basis 
for his products liability cause of action more than two years 
prior to the effective date of the amended version of U.C.A. §78-
15-3. 
POINT IV 
THERE EXISTS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO 
WHETHER ARAGON SHOULD HAVE DISCOVERED THE IDENTITY OF THE 
MANUFACTURER OF THE SUBJECT MASA FEEDER MACHINE PRIOR TO 
THE DATE ON WHICH SUCH IDENTITY WAS ACTUALLY DISCOVERED. 
The fact that Plaintiff did not discover the identity of Casa 
Herrerra, Inc. as the manufacturer of the subject masa feeder 
machine until July 13, 1990, is an undisputed fact in this matter. 
Nevertheless, Defendant/Respondent contends that the trial court 
could have determined, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff/Appellant 
should have discovered the identity of Casa Herrerra, Inc. more 
than two years prior to October 16, 1990 (the date on which Casa 
Herrerra, Inc. was joined to the action as a party Defendant). 
Plaintiff/ Appellant believes that this court cannot determine 
that issue, as a matter of law, for two reasons. First, in the 
trial court hearings, the issue of Aragon's efforts to discover the 
identity of the masa feeder machine manufacturer was not an issue 
that was actively adjudicated. The trial court did not have the 
full set of facts on this issue in front of it at the time it 
granted Casa Herrerra, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment. 
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Consequently, rather than making an informed decision based on 
facts, the trial court arbitrarily made an absolute determination, 
as a matter of law, that two years from the date of injury was 
ample time for any plaintiff to discover the identity of the 
manufacturer of an injurious product. Appellant is unaware of any 
law, either statutory or case law, that supports the trial court's 
legal conclusion. 
Furthermore, the issue of whether a plaintiff has used 
reasonable diligence to discover all the facts necessary for a 
cause of action to accrue under a "discovery rule" statute of 
limitations provision is ordinarily an issue for the trier of fact. 
See. Jacobv v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital. 662 P.2d 613, 618 
(Hawaii App. 1981); McCarroll v. Doctors General Hosp.. 664 P. 2d 
382, 385 (Okl. 1983); See also. Yerkes v. Rockwood Clinic. 527 P.2d 
689, 692-693 (Wash. App. 1974). 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has stated the following: 
"It has long been established in our law that a court 
should not take the case from the jury where there is any 
substantial dispute in the evidence on issues of fact, 
but can properly do so only when the matter is so plain 
that there really is no conflict in the evidence upon 
which reasonable minds could differ . . . . [U]nless the 
question is free from doubt, the court cannot pass upon 
it as a matter of law—if the court is in doubt whether 
reasonable men might arrive at different conclusions, 
then this very doubt determines the question to be one of 
fact for the jury and not one of law for the court." 
Flvnn v. W.P. Harlin Construction Co.. 509 P.2d 356, 361 (Utah 
1973); See also. Cruz v. Montova. 660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983) 
("If the evidence and its inferences would cause reasonable men to 
arrive at different conclusions as to whether the essential facts 
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were or were not proved, then the question is one of fact for the 
jury.11). The trial court made a supposed legal determination 
concerning the issue of whether the Plaintiff had been reasonably 
diligent in seeking the identity of Casa Herrerra, Inc., even 
though the court was provided with only a semblance of evidence 
from either party concerning this issue. 
Secondly, even based on the evidence in front of the trial 
court at the time of its decision, the court could not say, as a 
matter of law, that reasonable men could not arrive at different 
conclusions concerning whether Aragon was reasonably diligent. 
According to the evidence before the court at the time of its 
decision, Aragon made an attempt to discover the identity of the 
manufacturer of the subject masa feeder machine several months 
prior to the running of the original four-year statute of 
limitations (which statute of limitations initially governed this 
case). In addition, the owner of the masa feeder machine was 
extemely uncooperative in providing Aragon with such information. 
Therefore, Aragon had to rely on the slow, inefficient process of 
judicially supervised discovery in order to extract such 
information from the owner of the machine. Clearly, it is possible 
that a reasonable man would determine that Aragon exercised due 
diligence in attempting to discover the identity of the 
manufacturer of the masa feeder machine, based on these facts. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in determining, as a matter of 
law, that the Appellant/Plaintiff did not exercise due diligence in 
attempting to discover the identity of Casa Herrerra, Inc. 
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POINT V 
THE EQUITIES OF THIS CASE DICTATE THAT THE COURT SHOULD 
LIBERALLY CONSTRUE THE FACTS AND THE APPLICABLE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS PROVISION TO ALLOW THE PLAINTIFF/ 
APPELLANT TO PROCEED WITH HIS LAWSUIT AGAINST CASA 
HERRERRA, INC. ON ITS MERITS. 
As was stated in the Statement of Facts in Plaintiff's 
original Appellate Brief, Casa Herrerra, Inc. failed to file an 
answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Consequently, on January 
31, 1991, a Default Certificate and Default Judgment were entered 
against it and in favor of James M. Aragon, on the issue of 
liability, on Plaintiff's First and Second Claims for Relief 
(R.171-173). Casa Herrerra, Inc. then made a motion to set aside 
the Default, and the court granted that motion. The trial court 
entered its Order Setting Aside the Default on April 9, 1991 
(R.183-185, 195). Thereafter, the trial court allowed Casa 
Herrerra, Inc. to file a motion for summary judgment against the 
Plaintiff, based on a defense of failure to comply with the 
applicable statute of limitations (R. 443). That motion for 
summary judgment was ultimately granted on November 13, 1991 (R. 
523-525, 586-589). 
Thus, the trial court decided to set aside Plaintiff's Default 
Judgment against Casa Herrerra, Inc., although Plaintiff was 
clearly entitled to such Default Judgment. Then, without 
exhibiting any sense of fairness or equity, the trial court allowed 
Casa Herrerra, Inc. to obtain the equivalent of a default judgment 
against Plaintiff—by granting its motion for summary judgment 
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based on Plaintiff's alleged non-compliance with the statute of 
limitations. The trial court's actions fly in the face of the 
fundamental legal principle that one who seeks equity must do 
equity. Therefore, if it is necessary to weigh equitable 
determinations in order for the Appellate Court to render a 
decision in this matter, all such equities should be decided in 
favor of the Plaintiff/Appellant. After all, James M. Aragon at 
one time actually had a Default Judgment against Casa Herrerra, 
Inc. in this case, which Default Judgment was set aside by the 
trial court as an equitable measure, presumably, so that the case 
could be tried on its merits. 
POINT VI 
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER BORDEN, INC. PAID ARAGON'S WORKER'S 
COMPENSATION AWARD WAS NOT LITIGATED IN THE WORKER'S 
COMPENSATION PROCEEDINGS, AND LITIGATION OF SUCH ISSUE IS 
NOT BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA. 
Respondents, Clover Club Foods Company and Borden, Inc., argue 
that because the document filed with the Utah State Industrial 
Commission entitled "Compensation Agreement" listed both Clover 
Club Foods Company and "Borden" (R. 490) in the heading of such 
document as the employer, the issue of who paid James M. Aragon's 
worker's compensation award is res judicata, and cannot be 
litigated in the above entitled lawsuit. 
Preliminarily, it should be pointed out that such 
"Compensation Agreement" lists "Borden" as James M. Aragon's 
employer, rather than "Borden, Inc." (R. 490). (It is "Borden, 
Inc." who is a party to this lawsuit, rather than "Borden.") 
16 
Certainly, "Borden" is not the same legal entity as "Borden, Inc." 
The doctrine of res judicata is stated as follows: 
"[A] claim once litigated cannot be relitigated in a 
subsequent case between the same parties or their 
privies." 
Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch Corp., Inc., 659 P.2d 1045, 1048 
(Utah 1983). "Borden, Inc." was never a party to the Industrial 
Commission proceedings, although for some unexplained reason an 
entity by the name of "Borden" was listed as a party (R.487-490). 
Accordingly, all of Respondents' sophisticated arguments concerning 
res judicata are not applicable in this case. 
In addition, the doctrine of res judicata bars only the 
relitigation of claims that have once been adjudicated, or the 
litigation of claims that should have been adjudicated in the 
initial proceeding but were not. Church v. Meadow Springs Ranch 
Corp., Inc., 659 P.2d at 1048. In this case, Aragon's obvious 
common law employer, Clover Club Foods Company, had primary 
responsibility to pay Aragon's worker's compensation claim and was 
covered by worker's compensation insurance. Thus, there was never 
any need to adjudicate the issue of whether Borden, Inc. was also 
secondarily liable for Aragon's worker's compensation claim as 
Aragon's statutory employer. Furthermore, there is no evidence in 
the record to indicate that the issue of whether Borden, Inc. was 
Aragon's statutory employer was ever litigated. Moreover, there is 
no evidence in the record to indicate that it was ever necessary to 
litigate this issue. Accordingly, because this issue was neither 
an issue that was adjudicated nor an issue that should have been 
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adjudicated in the Industrial Commission proceedings, the 
litigation of such issue is not barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata. 
Finally, even if for the sake of argument this Court assumes 
that "Borden, Inc." was listed as a party on the "Compensation 
Agreement" (as a party who was jointly and severally liable to 
Aragon for his worker's compensation award), that fact alone does 
not establish that it was Borden, Inc. who actually paid such 
award. The only evidence in the record to indicate that Borden, 
Inc. may have actually paid any of James M. Aragon's worker's 
compensation award is the Affidavit of Rex J. Ballinger, which 
indicates the following: 
"Pursuant to the terms of the policy, Liberty Mutual on 
behalf of Borden and Clover Club paid James Aragon 
$17,537.40." (R.273). 
Mr. Ballinger does not indicate whether only one dollar of such 
amount was paid on behalf of Borden, Inc. and whether $17,536.40 
was paid on behalf of Clover Club Foods Company, or just what 
proportion of the money, if any, was paid by each party. At the 
very least, there is a factual issue in this case concerning the 
percentage of the worker's compensation award of James M. Aragon 
that was actually paid by Clover Club Foods Company, and the 
percentage of such worker's compensation award that was actually 
paid by Borden, Inc. If Borden, Inc. actually paid only a de 
minimis amount of such worker's compensation award, there would be 
no reason to give Borden, Inc. the benefit of the protection of the 
exclusive remedy provisions of U.C.A. §35-1-60. Therefore, such 
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issue is a material issue of fact, and precludes the granting of a 
summary judgment in this matter• 
The issue of whether Borden, Inc. actually paid any of the 
worker's compensation award assessed against Clover Club Foods 
Company (and possibly against Borden, Inc.) and in favor of Aragon 
was never adjudicated in the Industrial Commission proceeding, or 
otherwise. Based on the foregoing, because the issue of whether 
Borden, Inc. paid any of Aragon's worker's compensation award has 
never been litigated, it cannot be barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata. 
POINT VII 
THERE EXISTS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO 
WHETHER BORDEN, INC. IS ENTITLED TO THE PROTECTION OF THE 
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISIONS OF U.C.A. §35-1-60. 
As was stated in Respondent's brief, Appellant is not contest-
ing the fact that Clover Club Foods Company is a common law 
employer of Appellant, who paid the worker's compensation award of 
Appellant, and who is, therefore, entitled to the protection of the 
exclusive remedy provisions of U.C.A. §35-1-60. Accordingly, 
Appellant does not oppose the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in this matter concerning Clover Club Foods Company. 
However, as was stated in Appellant's original Appellate Brief, 
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Borden, 
Inc. is also a common law employer of Appellant, who also paid the 
worker's compensation award of Appellant, and who is also, 
therefore, entitled to the protection of the exclusive remedy 
provisions of U.C.A. §35-1-60. 
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Respondents are mistaken in asserting that the issue of 
whether Borden, Inc. was James M. Aragon's common law employer was 
litigated in the Industrial Commission proceedings. The fact that 
the name "Borden" appears in the heading of the pleading entitled 
"Compensation Agreement" does not magically bar Appellant from 
litigating the issue of whether Borden, Inc. is Appellant's common 
law employer. Even if "Borden, Inc." (rather than "Borden") was 
listed as an employer of Aragon on the "Compensation Agreement," no 
distinction was made in such "Compensation Agreement" concerning 
whether "Borden" was Aragon's common law employer or Aragon's 
statutory employer. Furthermore, as was set forth previously in 
this Reply Brief, the issue of whether Borden, Inc. actually paid 
Aragon's worker's compensation award has never been litigated. 
Thus, such issue is not barred from litigation by the doctrine of 
res judicata. Finally, a genuine issue of material fact exists 
concerning the extent of which, if any, Borden, Inc. paid Aragon's 
worker's compensation award. 
A genuine issue of material fact as to whether Borden, Inc. 
was James M. Aragon's common law employer is created by the 
following facts: 
1. There is no evidence in the record to indicate that 
Borden, Inc. exercised control over the every day work activities 
of James M. Aragon, other than in some indirect capacity as the 
100% stockholder of Clover Club Foods Company. 
2. At the time James M. Aragon applied for his job at Clover 
Club Foods Company, his employment application was submitted on a 
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Clover Club Foods Company form (R. 342, 343). When Aragon was 
terminated by Clover Club Foods Company, the termination document 
stated that Aragon was terminating employment with Clover Club 
Foods Company, with no mention of Borden, Inc. (R.345). In 
addition, when Aragon applied for a job and went to work for Clover 
Club Foods Company, he believed that he was working for Clover Club 
Foods Company, not Borden, Inc. (R.287, 288). 
A genuine issue of material fact as to whether Borden, Inc. 
actually paid any portion of Aragon's worker's compensation claim 
is created by the following facts: 
1. The Industrial Commission document entitled "Compensation 
Agreement" does not list "Borden, Inc." as the employer of Aragon, 
but only lists "Borden" (R. 490). Normally, an entity named 
"Borden" would not be the legal equivalent of an entity named 
"Borden, Inc." when listed as a party to a pleading. 
2. Even if the court were to assume that the so-called 
"Compensation Agreement" assessed joint and several liability 
against both Clover Club Foods Company and "Borden, Inc.," there is 
no indication on such pleading as to who actually paid such 
worker's compensation award. 
3. Even though Rex J. Ballinger states in his Affidavit (R. 
273) that Liberty Mutual paid James Aragon $17,537.40 on behalf of 
"Borden and Clover Club," there is no indication as to what portion 
of such $17,537.40 paid by Liberty Mutual to Aragon was paid on 
behalf of "Borden, Inc." and what portion was paid on behalf of 
Clover Club Foods Company. Certainly, if only one dollar (or some 
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other de minimis amount) was paid on behalf of Borden, Inc., it 
would be inequitable to determine as a matter of law that Borden, 
Inc. was entitled to immunity under the provisions of U.C.A. §35-1-
60, because it had paid Aragon's workers compensation award. 
POINT VIII 
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT TO 
DENY PLAINTIFF'S RULE 56(f) MOTION. 
Respondent contends that Aragon filed two strikingly similar 
Rule 56(f) motions in this case. An examination of those motions 
show that this contention is a misrepresentation. Plaintiff's 
first Rule 56(f) motion sought a continuance to obtain Defendants' 
answers to the discovery requests that had already been served on 
Defendants, so that Plaintiff could answer Defendants' U.R.C.P. 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (R. 134,135). Plaintiff's second 
Rule 56(f) motion sought to depose Rex J. Ballinger and Raymond E. 
Barkley, so that Plaintiff could rebut the statements made in the 
affidavits of Rex J. Ballinger and Raymond E. Barkley (R. 290-297, 
445-456). 
At the time Plaintiff filed his second Rule 56(f) motion, he 
had already expended significant efforts in an attempt to discover 
relevant corporate information from the Defendants. However, many 
of Defendants' answers to Plaintiff's discovery requests were non-
responsive. Therefore, at the time Plaintiff was required to 
respond to Defendant's motion for summary judgment (and to the 
affidavits of Rex J. Ballinger and Raymond E. Barkley), the only 
effective way for Plaintiff to explore the veracity of the 
22 
affidavits of Rex J. Ballinger and Raymond E. Barkley was to depose 
them. The affidavit testimony of Rex J. Ballinger and Raymond E. 
Barkley was critical information in relation to Defendants' motion 
for summary judgment. This affidavit testimony was relied upon 
heavily by the trial court in arriving at its decision to grant 
summary judgment. Without deposing Rex Ballinger and Raymond E. 
Barkley, Plaintiff had no way to either verify or contradict the 
information contained in their affidavits. Defendants refused to 
make Mr. Barkley and Mr. Ballinger available for depositions until 
the court had made a ruling on Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion. 
Ultimately, even though it was obvious that Plaintiff would be 
unable to present facts essential to justify his opposition to 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment, unless he was granted a 
continuance in order to depose Rex J. Ballinger and Raymond E. 
Barkley, the court failed to grant Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion. 
Then, the trial court relied upon the very information Plaintiff 
desired to rebut (the affidavits of Rex J. Ballinger and Raymond E. 
Barkley) as the primary basis for its ruling on Defendant's motion 
for summary judgment. This is the very type of unfair, inequitable 
treatment that constitutes arbitrary and capricious behavior on the 
part of a trial court. Clearly, such action constitutes reversible 
error in the exercise of the trial court's judicial discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's order of summary 
judgment concerning both Casa Herrerra, Inc. and Borden, Inc. 
should be reversed, and this case should be remanded to the trial 
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court to be tried on its merits. Accordingly, Plaintiff/Appellant 
James M. Aragon respectfully requests the court to reverse the 
order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of 
Defendant Casa Herrerra, Inc. and Borden, Inc. 
DATED this \2J^ day of June, 1992. 
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES 
DOUGLAS MZ^DURBANO 
PAUL H. JOHNSON 
Attorney*for Plaintiff/Appellant 
James M. Aragon 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES M. ARAGON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLOVER CLUB FOODS COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation; BORDEN, INC., a New 
Jersey corporation, CASA HERRERRA, 
INC., a California Corporation, 
and JOHN DOES I thru X, inclusive, 
Defendants. 
DEFAULT CERTIFICATE 
Civil No. 900747717PI 
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
It appearing from the file and records in the above-
entitled cause that the Defendant, Casa Herrerra, Inc., a 
California corporation, has been duly and properly served with 
Summons and Complaint, and said Defendant having failed to answer 
or otherwise plead to said Summons within the period of time 
permitted therefore by law, 
THE DEFAULT OF THE DEFENDANT IN THE PREMISES IS HEREWITH 
ENTERED. 
WITNESS: My hand and seal this %] day of ^MJUjMlL^f 1991. 
j 0 -f-
CLERK OF THE COURT 
(2\pldgs\85070.dec) 
By. 
Deputy Clerk 
K/<Y>> Nfli-fr 
f\V«$* 
APPENDIX B 
Douglas M. Durbano (#4209) 
Paul H. Johnson (#4856) 
Attorneys for 
4185 Harrison Boulevard, #320 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 621-4111 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES M. ARAGON, 
: 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLOVER CLUB FOODS COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation; BORDEN, INC., a New : 
Jersey corporation, CASA HERRERRA, 
INC., a California Corporation, : 
and JOHN DOES I thru X, inclusive, 
• 
Defendants. 
: 
It appearing from the file and records in the above-
entitled cause that the Defendant, Casa Herrerra, Inc., a 
California corporation, has been duly and properly served with 
Summons and Complaint, and said Defendant having failed to answer 
or otherwise plead to said Summons within the period of time 
permitted therefore by law, and the Clerk of the Court having 
heretofore entered the Default of the said Defendant in the 
premises, and it appearing to the Court that the Plaintiff is 
entitled to Judgment in accordance with the pleadings, it is now 
by the Court Ordered that: 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANT, CASA HERRERRA, INC., IS GRANTED AS FOLLOWS: 
Mmm ENTERED 
CL1 
3 V . 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900747717PI 
Judge Doulas L. Cornaby 
ftt#» 
1. Judgment is entered against the Defendant, Casa 
Herrerra, Inc., on the issue of liability on Plaintiff's First and 
Second Claims for Relief. 
2. Defendant, Casa Herrera, Inc., is liable to the 
Plaintiff for damages suffered by the Plaintiff as set forth in 
Plaintiff's Complaint, in an amount to be established pursuant to 
evidentiary hearing, which will be scheduled by the court. 
3. For costs of court in a sum to be established by 
Affidavit of the Plaintiff. 
4. Interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per 
annum on the judgment amount, from the time of the entry of 
judgment until paid in full. 
DATED AND ENTERED this 3/ day of
 c7Z„^*^y 1991 • 
^ ^ 
DOUGLAS-!/. CORNABY 
District Court Judge 
(2\pldgs\850570.dej) 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Argon v. Clover Club et al. -2-
APPENDIX C 
FILED IN CLM V '~ f»i FICE 
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Jay E. Jensen, #1676 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Casa Herrera 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: 355-3431 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES M. ARA60N, 
Plaintiff, 
v, 
CLOVER CLUB FOODS COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, BORDEN, INC., 
a New Jersey corporation, 
CASA HERRERA, INC., a California 
corporation, and JOHN DOES 
I through X, inclusive, 
Defendants. 
ORDER SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT 
AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900747717 PI 
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
The motion of the defendant Casa Herrera to set aside 
default and default judgment was heard during the pre-trial on 
Monday, April 8, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Douglas L. 
Cornaby in the above-entiteld Court. The parties were represented 
as follows: Paul H. Johnson for plaintiff, Allan T. Brinkerhoff 
for the defendants Clover Club Foods Company and Borden, Inc., and 
Jay E. Jensen for defendant Casa Herrera, Inc. The Court having 
considered the affidavits accompnying the motion and based upon 
the records herein, and good cause apearing, 
The motion of defendant Casa Herrera for an order 
setting aside the default and default judgment is hereby granted 
and said default and default judgment are hereby set aside. The 
FILMED 001097ft ^.utt twiBEU 
defendant Casa Herrera, Inc. is ordered to respond to the amended 
complaint dated August 14, 1990 by April 13, 1991. 
DATED the 9 day of April, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
S ^ ^ f , , , / ' / 
Dougwrs' L. Cornaby 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the day of April, 1991, 
a true and correct copy of ORDER SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Paul H. Johnson 
Douglas M. Durbano 
DURBANO & ASSOCIATES 
3340 Harrison Blvd., #200 
Ogden, UT 84403 
Allan T. Brinkerhoff 
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN 
310 South Main, #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
APPENDIX D 
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A p p l i c a n t ) • . *• - . . ' 
a • • • . . _ • 
% 
Clover Club v^A. r.« I *„A— and » COMPENSATION 
(Employer) * /.CKEtMENl 
-Utertv Mutual Tnniirflnre Hn 
•87-
1 4*i 
* In, 
>_JL 
,n<;7 I A 
,?7A 99 
.A02,29 
(Insurance Carrier) (C667-2A386 R) * 
Defendants. * * . . y() ft J 
WHEREAS, Jampn Ar«pn sustained a personal injury by 
accident arising out of or in the course of employment on the 16th dav of December , 
l^il while employed by Clnvpr Hlnh Fnnrfg Co,/ iomitn * *hlch •eeldent has 
been duly reported to the Industrial Commission of the State of Utah. According to the 
physician's reports and agreement between the parties hereto, said Applicant sustained, as 
a result of said accident, temporary total disability and/or permanent partial disability, 
as well as incurring medical and/or hospital expenses, as hereinafter set forth: 
1. Temporary total disability from 12/p/i^ to 5/5/R7 j 
payable at the rate of I 128.00 Per week for a total of t 5390,39 • 
has. been incurred and the carrier/employer has paid a total of I §39939 » 
of which the following amount was taxed: i n **. 
2. "Permanent partial disability based on 7ft weeks payable at the rate of 
t 128-00 per week beginning 6/15/87 for a total of SovS/, ,QQ 
•
nd * 513.00 n M Deen •dvanced thereunto, of which * _ Q was taxed**. 
Said permanent partial disability consists of the specific loss as follows: 
25% whole man 
3. Recapitulation of compensation benefits paid in connection with this claim: 
(a) Medical—Hospital and Miscellaneous incurred $ 
Paid to date 
Balance (if toy) due 
(b) Total Weekly Compensation Benefits due t_ 
Paid to date $ 
Balance (if any) due I 9472.00 
(c) Total Medical ar.i Compensation due per this Compensation 
Agreement: t 9472.00 
Pursuant to UCA 35-1-69, the Second Injury Fund will reimburse the carrier/employer, 
H/A X of all temporary total disability compensation and 
medical expenses paid on this claim and will pay the applicant weeks of compensa-
tion at the rate of $ for an impairment of 
for a total of t . 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the payment of the amounts stated in Section 3 
above — as provided by law — the Applicant hereby accepts the compensation and Medical 
payments paid to date and agrees with the permanent partial disability rating shown above. 
However, the Industrial Commission of Utah shall retain continuing jurisdiction to modify 
awards at provided by law. Medical expenses incurred as a result of the industrial acci-
dent are the continuing obligation of tbe insurance carrier or employer. 
It is understood that this agreement becomes binding and effective only when it is 
approved by the Industrial Commission. ^ 
525-21-im fiht*fi/J' /&. / s/^^^7 7 
Employee's Social Security Number -Signature of Applicant. Jam&fAragon (iCf/j 
—4JfULl(f$whMu* 
Signature ot Insurance Carrier/Employerrrary Birdson, 
li/A 
Signature of Second Injury fund Administrator 
The above Compensation has been reviewed and Is approved by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah. Attorney's fees of I 1420. 80 should be deducted from the Amounts owing and paid 
by the carrier/employer to Douglas Mf Durbflnn^jjfift; Ppf e y f f i h o ^ S * / g 4 0 . 8 0 . TCA 
Approved this 
I**r1 f I ^ MU\\mT£*tfCLV.V J. 1CE 
NOTr: COMPENSATION IS TAX EXEMPT PER SECTION 6334 (A) (*/OF SECTION 26, U S. CODE. 
Original will be returned to carrier/employer and signed copy to employee. Remember 
enclosures of Forms 122, 123, 1*1, and documents showing rating(s) by doetor(s). 
